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Abstract
Knowledge distillation is effective for producing small high-performance neural
networks for classification, but these small networks are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. We first study how robustness transfers from robust teacher to student
network during knowledge distillation. We find that a large amount of robustness
may be inherited by the student even when distilled on only clean images. Second,
we introduce Adversarially Robust Distillation (ARD) for distilling robustness
onto small student networks. ARD is an analogue of adversarial training but
for distillation. In addition to producing small models with high test accuracy
like conventional distillation, ARD also passes the superior robustness of large
networks onto the student. In our experiments, we find that ARD student models
decisively outperform adversarially trained networks of identical architecture on
robust accuracy. Finally, we adapt recent fast adversarial training methods to ARD
for accelerated robust distillation.
1 Introduction
State-of-the-art deep neural networks for many computer vision tasks have tens of millions of
parameters, hundreds of layers, and require billions of operations per inference [9, 25]. However,
networks are often deployed on mobile devices with limited compute and power budgets or on web
servers without GPUs. Such applications require efficient networks with light-weight inference costs
[7, 21, 4, 27].
Knowledge distillation was introduced as a way to transfer the knowledge of a large pre-trained
teacher network to a smaller light-weight student network [10]. Instead of training the student network
on one-hot class labels, distillation involves training the student network to emulate the outputs of
the teacher. Knowledge distillation yields compact student networks that surpass the performance
achievable by training from scratch without a teacher [10].
Classical distillation methods achieve high efficiency and accuracy but neglect security. Standard
neural networks are easily fooled by adversarial examples, in which small perturbations to inputs
cause mis-classification [8, 26]. This phenomenon leads to major security vulnerabilities for high-
stakes applications like self-driving cars and medical diagnosis [22, 12]. In such domains, efficiency
and accuracy are not enough - networks must also be robust.
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We study distillation methods that produce robust student networks. Unlike conventional adversarial
training [15, 24], which encourages a network to output correct labels within an -ball of training
samples, the proposed Adversarially Robust Distillation (ARD) instead encourages student networks
to mimic their teacher’s output within an -ball of training samples (See Figure 1). Thus, ARD is
a natural analogue of adversarial training but in the context of distillation. Formally, we solve the
minimax problem
min
θ
E(X,y)∼D
αt2 KL(Stθ(X + δθ), T t(X))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adversarially Robust Distillation loss
+(1− α) `(Stθ(X), y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
classification loss
 , (1)
where δθ = argmax‖δ‖p< `(S
t
θ(X + δ), y), T and S are teacher and student networks, and D is the
data generating distribution. See Section 5 for a more thorough description. Below, we summarize
our contributions in this paper:
• We show that knowledge distillation using only natural images can preserve much of the
teacher’s robustness to adversarial attacks (see Table 1), enabling the production of efficient
robust models without the cost of adversarial training.
• We introduce Adversarially Robust Distillation (ARD) for producing small robust student
networks. In our experiments, ARD students exhibit higher robust accuracy than adver-
sarially trained models with identical architecture, and ARD often exhibits higher natural
accuracy simultaneously. Interestingly, ARD students may exhibit even higher robust
accuracy than their teacher (see Table 1).
• We accelerate our method for efficient training by adapting fast adversarial training methods.
Model Robust Accuracy (Aadv)
AT ResNet18 teacher 44.46%
AT ResNet18→MobileNetV2 38.21%
AT ResNet18 ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 50.22%
Table 1: Performance of an adversarially trained (AT) teacher network and its student on CIFAR-10,
where robust accuracy (Aadv) is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack as in [15]. "→" denotes
"knowledge distillation onto". " ARD−−−→" denotes "adversarially robust distillation onto".
Table 1 shows that a student may learn robust behavior from a robust teacher, even if it only
sees clean images during distillation. Our method, ARD, outperforms knowledge distillation for
producing robust students. To gain intuition for the differences between these methods, we visualize
decision boundaries for a toy problem in Figure 2. Randomly generated training data are depicted
as colored dots with boxes showing the desired `∞ robustness radius. Background colors represent
the classification regions of the networks (10-layer teacher and 5-layer student). In each case, the
network achieves perfect training accuracy. A training point is vulnerable to attack if its surrounding
box contains multiple colors. Results in Figure 2 are consistent with our experiments in Section 5 on
more complex datasets.
Figure 1: Adversarially Robust Distillation (ARD) works by minimizing discrepancies between softmax outputs
of the teacher on natural images and outputs of a student on adversarial images.
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(a) Student of non-robust teacher (b) Student of robust teacher (c) ARD student (d) Robust teacher
Figure 2: A student distilled from a robust teacher using knowledge distillation is more robust than a naturally
trained network, but ARD produces a more robust network than either and closely mimics the teacher’s decision
boundary. Adversarially vulnerable training points have `∞ boxes outlined in red.
2 Related Work
Early schemes for compressing neural networks involved binarized weights to reduce storage and
computation costs [4]. Other early efforts focused on speeding up calculations via low-rank regular-
ization and pruning weights to reduce computation costs [27, 13]. Knowledge distillation teaches
a student network to mimic a more powerful teacher [10]. The student network is usually a small,
lightweight architecture like MobileNetV2 [21].
Knowledge distillation has also been adapted for robustness in a technique called defensive distillation
[19]. In this setting, the teacher and student networks have identical architectures. An initial network
is trained on the class labels of a problem and then distilled at temperature t onto a network of identical
architecture. Defensive distillation improves robustness to a certain `0 attack, while maintaining
natural accuracy [19]. However, defensive distillation gains robustness due to gradient masking, and
this defense has been broken using `0, `∞, and `2 attacks [1, 2].
Various methods exist that modify networks to achieve robustness. Some model-specific variants
of adversarial training utilize surrogate loss functions to minimize the difference in network output
on clean and adversarial data [31, 16], feature denoising blocks[29], and adversarial logit pairing to
squeeze logits from clean and adversarial inputs[11]. Still other methods, such as JPG compression,
pixel deflection, and image superresolution, are model-agnostic and seek to minimize the effect of
adversarial examples by transforming inputs to the network [7, 20, 18].
Recently, there has been work on defensive-minded compression. The authors of [28] and [32] study
the preservation of robustness under quantization. Defensive Quantization involves quantizing a
network while minimizing the Lipschitz constant to encourage robustness [14]. While quantization
reduces space complexity, it does not reduce the number of Multiply-Add (MAdd) operations needed
for inference, although operations performed at lower precision may be faster depending on hardware.
Moreover, Defensive Quantization is not evaluated against strong attackers.
3 Problem Setup
Knowledge distillation employs a teacher-student paradigm in which a small student network learns
to mimic the output of an often much larger teacher model [10]. Knowledge distillation in its purist
form entails the minimization problem,
min
θ
`KD(θ), `KD(θ) = EX∼D
[
KL(Stθ(X), T
t(X))
]
, (2)
where KL is KL divergence, S is a student network with parameters θ and temperature t, T is a
teacher network with temperature t, and X is an input to the networks drawn from data generating
distribution D. The temperature constant refers to a number by which the logits are divided before
feeding them into the softmax function. Intuitively, knowledge distillation involves minimizing the
average distance from the student’s output to the teacher’s output over data from a distribution. The
softmax outputs of the teacher network, also referred to as soft labels, may be more informative than
true data labels alone. In [10], the authors suggest using a linear combination of the loss function,
`KD(θ), and the cross-entropy between the softmax output of the student network and the one-hot
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vector representing the true label in order to improve natural accuracy of the student model, especially
on difficult datasets. In this case, we have
`KD(θ) = E(X,d)∼D
[
αt2KL(Stθ(X), T
t(X) + (1− α)`(Stθ(X), y)
]
, (3)
where ` is the standard cross-entropy loss, and y is the label. In our experiments, we use α = 1 except
where otherwise noted. We investigate if students trained using this method inherit their teachers’
robustness to adversarial attacks. We also combine knowledge distillation with adversarial training.
Adversarial training is another method for encouraging robustness to adversarial attacks during
training [24]. Adversarial training involves the minimax optimization problem,
min
θ
E(X,y)∼D
[
max
‖δ‖p<
Lθ(X + δ, y)
]
, (4)
where Lθ(X + δ, y) is the loss of network with parameters θ, input X perturbed by δ, and label
y. Adversarial training encourages a student to produce the correct label in an -ball surrounding
data points. Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) and TRADES instead use as a loss function a linear
combination of cross-entropy loss and KL divergence between the network’s softmax output from
clean input and from adversarial input [16, 31]. The KL divergence term acts as a consistency
regularizer which trains the neural network to produce identical output on a natural image and
adversarial images generated from the natural image. As a result, this term encourages the neural
network’s output to be constant in -balls surrounding data points.
Knowledge distillation is useful for producing accurate student networks when highly accurate teacher
networks exist. However the resulting student networks may not be robust to adversarial attacks
[2]. We combine knowledge distillation and adversarial training to similarly produce robust student
networks when robust teacher networks exist.
We focus on adversarial robustness to `∞ attacks since these are pervasive in the literature. Thus,
we carry out both adversarial training and ARD with FGSM-based PGD `∞ attacks similarly to
[15, 31]. We re-implemented the methods from these papers to perform adversarial training. In our
experiments, we use WideResNet (34-10) and ResNet18 teacher models as well as MobileNetV2
students. Adversarial training and TRADES teacher models are as described in [15, 31]. See appendix
sections A and G for more information on models, attacks, and training.
4 Adversarial robustness is preserved under knowledge distillation
It is now accepted that distillation from a naturally trained teacher does not produce robust models.
But if we distill from an adversarially hardened teacher, will the student learn to be robust?
If robustness transfers from teacher to student, we can produce accurate, robust, and efficient student
networks. Moreover, since adversarial training is slow due to the bottleneck of crafting adversarial
samples for every batch, we could create many different student networks from one teacher, and
adversarial training would only need to be performed once. This routine of training a robust teacher
and then distilling onto robust students would be far more time efficient than training many robust
student networks individually.
4.1 Non-robust teachers produce non-robust students
Knowledge distillation and defensive distillation with non-robust teacher networks are known to
produce student networks that are vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks [2]. To establish a
baseline for comparison, we distill using non-robust ResNet18 as a teacher, and evaluate against the
same 20-step PGD attack on which we will evaluate our models. These results can be found in Table
2.
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Model Anat Aadv
ResNet18 teacher 94.75% 0.0%
ResNet18→ ResNet18 94.92% 0.0%
ResNet18→MobileNetV2 93.53% 0.0%
Table 2: Performance of a naturally trained teacher network and its students distilled (with t = 30) on
CIFAR-10, where robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack as in [15]. Anat denotes
natural accuracy.
4.2 Robust teachers can produce robust students, even distilling on only clean data
Next, we substitute in a robust adversarially trained ResNet18 teacher network, and run the same
experiments. We find that our new student networks are far more robust than students of the non-
robust teacher (see Table 3). In fact, the student networks learn most of the teacher’s robust accuracy.
Student Model Anat Aadv
AT ResNet18 teacher 76.54% 44.46%
AT ResNet18→ ResNet18 76.13% 40.13%
AT ResNet18→MobileNetV2 76.86% 38.21%
Table 3: Performance of an adversarially trained ResNet18 teacher network and student networks of
various size distilled on CIFAR-10, where robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack as
in [15].
4.3 Not all robust networks are good teachers, and robustness does not transfer on some
datasets
In the previous experiments, we see that a student network may inherit a significant amount of
robustness from a robust teacher network during knowledge distillation. However, some robust
teachers are not conducive to this robustness transfer. We use robust WideResNet (34-10) models
trained using adversarial training and TRADES to show that these models do not transfer robustness
well during knowledge distillation (See Table 4). Additionally, a robust WRN teacher model transfers
almost no robustness under knowledge distillation against 20-step PGD untargeted attacks on CIFAR-
100, a much harder dataset for robustness than CIFAR-10 (See Table 5).
For these reasons, we develop ARD for distilling a variety of teachers onto produce robust stu-
dents. Using this methods, robustness is preserved on architectures and datasets that do not transfer
robustness under vanilla distillation.
Model Anat Aadv
AT WRN teacher 84.41% 45.75%
TRADES WRN teacher 84.92% 56.61%
AT WRN→MN 92.49% 5.46%
TRADES WRN→MN 85.6% 21.69%
Table 4: Robust WRN34-10 teacher models
and their students on CIFAR-10, where robust
accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD
attack as in [15].
Model Anat Aadv
AT WRN teacher 59.9% 28.36%
AT WRN→MN 25.54% 1.30%
AT WRN→MN
(α = 0.95) 75.94% 0.02%
AT WRN→MN
(α = 0.93) 76.38% 0.00%
Table 5: Robust teacher network and its stu-
dents on CIFAR-100, where robust accuracy
is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack as in
[15].
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5 Improving the robustness of student models with Adversarially Robust
Distillation (ARD)
We combine knowledge distillation, adversarial training, and TRADES/VAT to produce small robust
student models from much larger robust teacher models using a method we call Adversarially Robust
Distillation. ARD not only produces more robust students than knowledge distillation, but it also
works for teachers and datasets on which knowledge distillation is ineffective for transferring robust-
ness. Our procedure is a natural analogue of adversarial training but in a distillation setting. During
standard adversarial training, we force a network to produce the ground truth label corresponding to a
clean input when the network is exposed to an adversary. Along the same lines, our method treats the
teacher network’s softmax output on clean data as the ground truth and trains a student network to
reproduce this ground truth when exposed to adversarial examples. We start with a robust teacher
model, T , and we train the student model Sθ by solve the following optimization problem:
min
θ
E(X,y)∼D
[
αt2KL(Stθ(X + δθ), T
t(X)) + (1− α)`(Stθ(X), y)
]
, (1 revisited)
where δθ = argmax‖δ‖p< `(S
t
θ(X + δ), y), ` is cross-entropy loss and we divide the logits of both
student and teacher models by temperature term t during training. The t2 term is used as in [10] since
dividing the logits shrinks the gradient. The cross-entropy loss, which encourages natural accuracy,
can be seen as a standard training term. Thus, α is a hyperparameter that prioritizes similarity to
the teacher over natural accuracy. In our experiments, we set α = 1 except where otherwise noted,
eliminating the cross-entropy term. Our training routine involves the following procedure:
Algorithm 1: Adversarially Robust Distillation (ARD)
Require: Student and teacher networks S and T , learning rate γ, dataset {(xi, yi)}, number of steps,
K, per PGD attack, and  maximum attack radius.
Initialize θ, the weights S;
for Epoch = 1,...,Nepochs do
for Batch = 1,...,Nbatches do
Construct adversarial example x′i for each xi ∈ Batch by maximizing cross-entropy between
Sθ(x
′
i) and yi constrained to ‖xi − x′i‖p <  using K-step PGD.
Compute∇θ`ARD({xi}, θ) =
∑
i∇θ[αt2KL(Stθ(x′i), T t(xi)) + (1− α)`(Stθ(X),y)],
over the current batch.
θ ← θ − γ∇θ`ARD({xi}, θ)
See appendix sections C and G for additional information about training and our choice of loss
function.
5.1 ARD works with large teachers that fail to transfer robustness under knowledge
distillation
In Section 4, we saw that that some teacher networks do not readily transfer robustness to students. We
see through our experiments in Table 6 that ARD is able to create robust students from teachers whose
robustness failed to transfer during conventional knowledge distillation. TRADES and adversarially
trained MobileNetV2 models are each simultaneously beaten in natural and robust accuracy by an
ARD variant. In these experiments, the WideResnet teacher model contains 20× as many parameters
and performs 70× as many MAdd operations as the MobileNetV2 student.
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Model Anat Aadv
TRADES WRN teacher 84.92% 56.61%
AT MobileNetV2 80.50% 46.90%
TRADES MobileNetV2 83.59% 44.79%
TRADES WRN ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 82.63% 50.42%
TRADES WRN ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 (α = 0.95) 84.70% 46.28%
Table 6: Performance on CIFAR-10, where robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack
as in [15].
5.2 ARD works on datasets where knowledge distillation fails
In Section 4, we saw that a student network inherited little to no robustness from an adversarially
trained teacher network on CIFAR-100. This dataset is very difficult to protect from untargeted
attacks because it contains many classes that are similar in appearance. In Table 7, we see that a
MobileNetV2 model trained on CIFAR-100 using ARD from an adversarially trained WideResNet is
more robust than an adversarially trained MobileNetV2. In fact, the ARD model is nearly as robust
as its teacher.
Model Anat Aadv
AT WRN teacher 59.90% 28.36%
AT MobileNetV2 55.62% 22.80%
AT WRN ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 (α = 0.93) 55.47% 27.64%
Table 7: Performance on CIFAR-100, where robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack
as in [15].
5.3 ARD can produce networks more robust than their teacher
In some experiments, ARD student networks are more robust than their teacher. Interestingly, this
behavior does not depend on distilling from a high-capacity network to a low capacity network;
distilling Resnet18 onto itself and MobileNetV2 onto itself using ARD results in better robustness
than adversarial training alone.
We seek to understand if this increased robustness is caused by differences between the student and
teacher architectures, and so we use ARD to distill a teacher network onto a student network with an
identical architecture. In our experiments, ARD boosted the robustness of both the ResNet18 and
MobileNetV2 models (See Table 8).
Model Anat Aadv
AT ResNet18 76.54% 44.46%
AT MobileNetV2 80.50% 46.90%
AT ResNet18 ARD−−−→ ResNet18 79.49% 51.21%
AT MobileNetV2 ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 81.22% 47.95%
AT ResNet18 ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 79.47% 50.22%
Table 8: Performance on CIFAR-10, where robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack
as in [15].
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5.4 Accelerating ARD using fast adversarial training methods
The ARD procedure described above takes approximately the same amount of time as adversarial
training. Adversarial training is slow since it requires far more gradient calculations than natural
training. Several methods have been proposed recently for performing adversarial training in the
same amount of time as natural training [23, 30]. We demonstrate accelerated performance for ARD
by adapting the “free” adversarial training from [23] for distillation.
This version, Fast-ARD, described in Algorithm 2, is equally fast to plain knowledge distillation.
During training, we replay each mini-batch several times in a row. On each replay, we simultaneously
compute the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the image and parameters using the same backward pass.
Then, we update the adversarial attack and the network’s parameters simultaneously. Empirically,
Fast-ARD produces less robust students than the full ARD above, but it produces higher robust
accuracy compared to free trained models with identical architecture as seen in Table 9. Furthermore,
Fast-ARD from a TRADES WideResNet onto MobileNetV2 produces a more robust student than
our most robust MobileNetV2 produced during knowledge distillation and in the same amount of
training time. Our accelerated algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Fast-ARD with free adversarial training
Requires: Student and teacher networks S and T , learning rate γ, norm p, dataset {(xi, yi)}, and
attack step-size r and radius 
Initialize θ, the weights of network S, and set δ = 0.
for Epoch = 1,...,Nepochsm do
for Batch = 1,...,Nbatches do
for j = 1,..., m do
For xi ∈ Batch, find new perturbation δ′i by maximizing cross-entropy between
Sθ(xi + δi + δ
′
i) and yi over δ
′
i, constrained to ‖δi + δ′i‖p < , using a 1-step PGD
attack.
Compute the gradient of the loss function
∇θ`ARD({xi}, θ) =
∑
i∇θ[αt2KL(Stθ(x′i), T t(xi)) + (1− α)`(Stθ(X),y)], over
current batch.
δi ← δi + δ′i
θ ← θ − γ∇θ`ARD({xi}, θ)
Model Anat Aadv
Free trained MobileNetV2 (m=4) 82.63% 23.13%
TRADES WideResNet F-ARD−−−−→MobileNetV2 (m=4) 83.51% 37.07%
Free trained MobileNetV2 (m=8) 72.30% 27.96%
TRADES WideResNet F-ARD−−−−→MobileNetV2 (m=8) 76.38% 36.85%
Table 9: Performance of MobileNetV2 classifiers, free trained and Fast-ARD, on CIFAR-10, where
robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack as in [15]. " F-ARD−−−−→" denotes "Fast-ARD
onto".
5.5 ARD and Fast-ARD models are more robust than their adversarially trained
counterparts
While 20-step PGD is a powerful attack, we also test ARD against other `∞ attackers including
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method [6], DeepFool [17], 1000-step PGD, and PGD with
random restarts. We find that our ARD and Fast-ARD models outperform adversarial training and
free training respectively across all attacks we tried (see Table 10).
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Model MI-FGSM20 DeepFool 1000-PGD 20-PGD 100-restarts
AT MN 50.82% 57.74% 46.51% 46.79%
ARD−−−→MN 55.16% 64.61% 49.98% 50.30%
Free trained MN (m=4) 30.60% 41.09% 22.23% 22.94%
F-ARD−−−−→MN (m=4) 44.78% 60.03% 36.01% 36.88%
Table 10: Robust validation accuracy of adversarially trained and free trained MobileNetV2 and
TRADES WRN ARD (and Fast-ARD) onto MobileNetV2 on CIFAR-10 under various attacks. All
attacks use  = 8255 .
6 Discussion
We find that knowledge distillation allows a student network to absorb a large amount of a teacher
network’s robustness to adversarial attacks, even when the student is only trained on clean data.
Moreover, we see that the student model loosely mimics the decision boundary of the teacher model in
simple cases. However, in some cases, a distilled student model is still far less robust than the teacher.
In these same simple cases, the ARD student closely mimics the decision boundary of the teacher. To
improve student robustness, we introduce Adversarially Robust Distillation (ARD) for producing
robust student models from robust teachers. In our experiments, student models trained using our
method outperform similar networks trained using adversarial training in robust and sometimes
natural accuracy. Furthermore, we adapt free adversarial training for our method and demonstrate
accelerated performance.
Recent work on distillation has produced significant improvements over vanilla knowledge distillation
[3]. We believe that Knowledge Distillation with Feature Maps could improve both natural and robust
accuracy of student networks. Adaptive data augmentation like AutoAugment [5] may also improve
performance of both normal knowledge distillation for robust teachers and ARD. Finally, with the
recent publication of fast adversarial training methods [23, 30], we hope to further accelerate ARD.
Our implementation of ARD can be found at github.com/goldblum/AdversariallyRobustDistillation
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Space and time efficiency of student and teacher models
We perform our primary experiments for ARD with WideResNet (34-10) and ResNet18 teacher
models as well as a MobileNetV2 student model. We consider two network qualities for evaluating
the efficiency of our teacher and student networks in order to quantify compression. First, we
study space efficiency by counting the number of parameters in a network. Second, we study time
complexity. To this end, we compute the total multiply-add (MAdd) operations performed during a
single inference. The real time elapsed during this inference will also vary as a result of parallelization
harnessed in implementation and deep learning framework, so we use MAdd, which is invariant
under implementation and framework, to study time complexity.
The WideResNet and ResNet18 teacher models we employ contain ∼ 46.2M and ∼ 11.2M param-
eters respectively, while the MobileNetV2 student model contains ∼ 2.3M parameters. A forward
pass through the WRN and ResNet18 teacher models takes ∼ 13.3B MAdd operations and ∼ 1.1B
MAdd operations respectively, while a forward pass through the student model takes ∼ 187M MAdd
operations. To summarize these network traits, compared to a WideResnet (34-10) teacher, the
MobileNetV2 student model:
• Contains ∼ 5% as many parameters
• Performs ∼ 1.4% as many MAdd operations during a forward pass
7.2 Appendix B: The effects of temperature, α, and data augmentation for knowledge
distillation of robust teacher models
We show the results of experiments in Table 11, varying temperature and α. We see that only very
low temperature terms are not conducive to robustness preservation, but knowledge distillation is not
highly sensitive to temperature, and a wide array of temperature terms are effective for producing
robust students. On the other hand, robustness transfer decays rapidly when α decreases. This effect
produces a robustness-accuracy tradeoff.
Data augmentation yields dramatic improvements for robustness transfer as the student gets to see
the teacher’s behavior at more data points, as can be seen in Table 12. A natural idea is to teach
the student the teacher’s behavior at adversarial points as well. However, this data augmentation
technique greatly decreases training speed and does not provide significant improvement.
Temperature Anat Aadv
1 77.37% 35.44%
10 78.1% 38.55%
30 76.86% 38.21%
50 76.28% 38.5%
100 76.44% 38.65%
α Anat Aadv
1.00 76.86% 38.21%
0.99 82.93% 28.36%
0.95 91.58% 9.65%
0.90 92.34% 7.96%
0.70 92.33% 7.54%
0.50 92.14% 2.73%
Table 11: Performance of adversarially trained ResNet18 teacher network distilled onto MobileNetV2
(MN) with different temperature terms and α terms on CIFAR-10, where robust accuracy is with
respect to a 20-step PGD attack as in [15].
7.3 Appendix C: Notes on loss functions for ARD
We tried other versions of the loss function with the addition of a (non-adversarial) knowledge
distillation KL divergence term, which increases natural accuracy slightly but sharply decreases
robust accuracy, and the addition of cross-entropy between the softmax of the adversarially attacked
student and the one-hot label vectors, which is redundant in combination with the ARD loss and
empirically harms robustness. We also explored using T t(x′i) instead of T
t(xi) in the KL divergence
term in the loss function, but the accuracy, both natural and robust, decreased. Additionally, passing an
adversarial example through the teacher model will slow down training and sharply increase memory
consumption if the teacher is much larger than the student. Our method does not require forward
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Data Augmentation Anat Aadv
No augmentation 75.76% 32.05%
Horizontal flips 76.24% 35.39%
Random crops 76.31% 37.31%
Both flips and crops 76.86% 38.21%
Adversarial examples generated from teacher net 76.76% 38.33%
Table 12: Performance of adversarially trained WideResNet distilled onto MobileNetV2 (MN) with
various data augmentation on CIFAR-10, where robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD
attack as in [15].
passes through the teacher during training as long as logits of the training data are stored ahead of
time. We explored generating adversarial attacks during training by maximizing KL divergence
instead of cross-entropy. This technique lowers natural accuracy without improving robust accuracy.
In our training routine, we employ data augmentation in the form of random crops and horizontal flips.
We intend to explore adaptive data augmentation methods tailored specifically for robust distillation.
7.4 Appendix D: ARD with naturally trained teacher models
ARD encourages a student to produce, for all images within an -ball of a data point, the teacher’s
output at that data point. Thus, it seems reasonable to try using ARD with a naturally trained teacher
model. As evident in Table 13, naturally trained teachers produce robust students, but these students
may be less robust than those of robust teachers and less robust than adversarially trained models
with identical architecture.
Model Anat Aadv
ResNet18 ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 84.18% 44.61%
WRN ARD−−−→MobileNetV2 84.43% 42.51%
Table 13: Performance of MobileNetV2 students distilled from naturally trained teachers on CIFAR-
10, where robust accuracy is with respect to a 20-step PGD attack as in [15].
7.5 Appendix E: Improving the speed of ARD by reducing the number of attack steps
Another way to improve the speed of ARD training is to reduce the number of attack steps in order
to reduce the number of gradient calculations. In our experiments shown in Table 14, reducing the
number of attack steps improves natural accuracy while decreasing robust accuracy. This procedure
has a similar effect to reducing α. We suggest this strategy over reducing α since it has the added
benefit of accelerating training.
Attack Steps (training) Anat Aadv
4 84.28% 46.49%
6 83.38% 48.35%
10 82.63% 50.42%
Table 14: Performance of TRADES WideResNet distilled onto MobileNetV2 using ARD with
adversaries generated using different numbers of attack steps on CIFAR-10. Robust accuracy is with
respect to a 20-step PGD attack as in [15].
7.6 Appendix F: Sensitivity of ARD to temperature and α
Compared to knowledge distillation for preserving robustness, ARD is less sensitive to the temperature
parameter. We found that varying the temperature parameter does not significantly impact either the
natural or robust accuracy of the resulting student (See Table 15). Like with knowledge distillation,
varying α presents an accuracy-robustness tradeoff. However, unlike with knowledge distillation, we
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find that under ARD, robust accuracy decays far slower as α decreases so that ARD is less sensitive
to this parameter.
Temperature Anat Aadv
1 81.41% 49.57%
5 82.24% 48.77%
10 82.33% 48.93%
30 82.63% 50.42%
50 82.14% 48.97%
α Anat Aadv
1.00 82.63% 50.42%
0.95 84.7% 46.28%
0.90 86.58% 41.16%
0.70 90.57% 25.18%
0.50 83.00% 13.09%
Table 15: Performance of TRADES WideResNet distilled onto MobileNetV2 using ARD with
different temperature terms and values of α on CIFAR-10, where robust accuracy is with respect to a
20-step PGD attack as in [15].
7.7 Appendix G: Our hyperparameters for training
We train our models for 200 epochs with SGD and a momentum term of 2(10−4). We tried using
other optimizers such as ADAM, but SGD yields superior results. Fast-ARD models are trained
for 200m epochs so that they take the same amount of time as natural distillation. We use an initial
learning rate of 0.1 and we decrease the learning rate by a factor of 10 on epochs 100 and 150 (epochs
100
m and
150
m for Fast-ARD). Except for our temperature experiments, we used a temperature term of
30 for CIFAR-10 and 5 for CIFAR-100. We did not run temperature experiments for CIFAR-100,
and another choice may improve results. To craft adversarial examples during training, we use
FGSM-based PGD with 10 steps, `∞ attack radius of  = 8255 , a step size of
2
255 , and a random start
[15]. For our experiments, we employ a heterogeneous mix of local machines and cluster nodes with
NVIDIA P5000, P100, and GV100 GPUs, so we use hardware-agnostic measures of efficiency and
training time.
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